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The Crack of Dawn
Perceptual Functions and Neural Mechanisms that Mark the Transition 
from Unconscious Processing to Conscious Vision
Victor Lamme
There is conscious vision, and there is unconscious visual processing. So far so
good. But where lies the boundary between the two? What are the visual func-
tions that shape the transition from “processing in the dark” to having a conscious
visual percept? And what are the neural mechanisms that carry that transition? I
review the findings on feature detection, object categorization, interference, infer-
ence, Gestalt grouping, and perceptual organization, and examine to what extent
these functions correlate with the presence or absence of conscious vision. It turns
out that a surprisingly large set of visual functions is executed unconsciously, in-
dicating that unconscious vision is much “smarter” than we might intuitively think.
Only when these unconscious mechanisms fail,  and more elaborate and incre-
mental processing steps are required, is consciousness necessary. The function of
conscious vision may be to add a final layer to our interpretation of the world, to
solve relatively “new” visual problems, and to enable visual learning.
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What do we need  to  know about  conscious-
ness? Which aspect of it is most mysterious?
What  do  we  want  philosophy,  psychology,
neuroscience, computer science, or even phys-
ics to tell us about consciousness that we do
not already know? The answer to that ques-
tion may vary from person to person. To me it
is this very simple thing: why do I see? Why
do  I  have  conscious  experiences  whenever  I
open my eyes? What makes the 1.5 kilograms
of  protein  and  fat  in  my  head  give  me  the
wonderful  sensations  I  experience  every  day,
from the second I wake up until the moment I
fall asleep? 
The point is probably best illustrated by
the difference between a digital  photo camera
and the human mind. A camera nowadays can
do wonderful things. It can record an image at
extreme resolutions,  with  the  right  focus  and
exposure,  all  by itself.  It  can identify  a face,
putting it in a frame on the screen, and writing
the name below it of the person it recognizes.
You can leave it to push the button at the mo-
ment everybody smiles.  Connect it  to a com-
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puter, and it will detect emotions, recognize ob-
jects, or read handwriting on a letter. Surveil-
lance cameras can detect suspicious movements
or strange behaviours in crowds, outperforming
human  night-guards  or  intelligence  agents.
There is one big difference between the camera
and the human mind, though. The camera does
not  see.1 I  do.  And so does  the  night  guard,
most of the time. It is this aspect of visual pro-
cessing that is in need of an explanation. Not
the fact that I recognize the person in front of
me, can read his emotions, talk to him, or pick
up the cup of coffee he gives me. I can vaguely
understand  how  my  brain  enables  me  to  do
that.  What I  do not  understand is  how it  is
that I see all those things. 
Is that the “hard problem” all over? Am I
talking Qualia? Not in the strict sense. In its
original  formulation,  the  hard  problem  would
argue that there is no function, no neural pro-
cess  whatsoever  that  could  ever  explain  con-
scious  sensations  (Chalmers 1995).  Functions
explain functions, but not the fact that I see.
Qualia  are  defined  as  ineffable  aspects  of  in-
formation: the redness of red, stripped of every
possible functional property or reactive disposi-
tion. And with that comes the whole charade of
inverted spectra, colour scientists called Mary,
and explanatory gaps. Which didn’t get us all
that far—so let’s not chase that unicorn again.
It’s not that I don’t want to address the
hard problem, or  bridge the explanatory gap.
That is in fact exactly what I am after (Lamme
2010a, 2010b). But I would like to leave that for
later. What we need to recognize, first, is that
there must be some functions and some neural
processes  that  are  more  closely  connected  to
seeing than others (Crick & Koch 1998,  2003).
For example, it is fairly reasonable to assume
that an understanding of the neural basis of a
reflexive motor response—like the pulling away
of your hand when it touches fire— does very
little towards explaining consciousness (Lamme
&  Roelfsema 2000;  Lamme 2006). Other func-
1 Or at least we assume it does not. This is the basic intuition we start
from in trying to explain consciousness. If not, one easily slides into
pan-psychism. That is a viable option of course: it could be that the
camera does see, yet cannot “tell” us. However, the arguments put
forward in the remainder of this paper seem to suggest that the cam-
era does not see. 
tions may offer a better gateway. For example
because they explain some fundamental aspect
of seeing (Seth 2010), such as its unity, or be-
cause they coincide with the difference between
conscious  visual  processing  and  visual  pro-
cessing  that  occurs  “in  the  dark”  (Lamme
2010a, 2010b). In trying to bridge the explanat-
ory gap, I think it is important to first find the
right  tree  up  which  to  bark.  We  must  first
identify the exact boundaries between conscious
and unconscious processing. The hard problem
can then be attacked afterwards. Or maybe that
whole explanatory gap will vanish right before
our eyes once we are there.
This  paper  is  about  exactly  that.  Let’s
find the visual functions and neural  processes
that take us as  close as possible  to the hard
problem, as close as possible towards explaining
why we humans see,  while  photo  cameras  do
not. And let’s avoid barking up the wrong tree. 
2 Why dolphins are not fish
To find the cognitive functions and neural pro-
cesses that take us towards understanding the
phenomenality of consciousness it is important
to establish a boundary—a boundary with what
we should call unconscious processing. This will
by no means be an easy job (Lamme 2006). In
fact,  the  whole  issue  of  understanding  con-
sciousness  and solving  the explanatory gap is
about  positioning  that  boundary.  There  are
situations where it is in fact unclear whether we
should talk about a conscious sensation or not.
Take the situation of a split-brain patient: here,
a stimulus presented to the left visual field will
be processed by the right half brain, typically
devoid of communication via language. Hence,
the subject will  tell you that she did not see
that stimulus. He may draw the stimulus, how-
ever, using his left hand. Or the left hand may
point at the stimulus, or match it to a related
subject (Gazzaniga 2005). Who are we to be-
lieve,  then?  The  hand  or  the  mouth?  What
types of behaviour may count as evidence for
conscious sensations? Just speech? What about
aphasic subjects, then? Similarly, there are con-
ditions like neglect, or manipulations of atten-
tion (change blindness, inattentional blindness),
Lamme, V. (2015). The Crack of Dawn—Perceptual Functions and Neural Mechanisms that Mark the Transition from Unconscious Processing to
Conscious Vision. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 22(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570092 2 | 34
www.open-mind.net
where  it  is  difficult  to  be  entirely  sure  that
what appears to be not seen is in fact maybe
just not attended to, and hence forgotten or not
cognitively accessible and hence not reportable
(Lamme 2003, 2006, 2010). This uncertainty has
sparked a lively debate on the nature of con-
sciousness, its potential independence of cognit-
ive functions like attention, working memory, or
access  (Lamme 2004,  2010a,  2010b),  and
whether  consciousness  can  ever  be  separated
from a report about consciousness (Block 2005,
2007;  Dehaene et  al. 2006;  Cohen &  Dennett
2011;  Fahrenfort &  Lamme 2012). This debate
is all about the difference between seeing and
knowing, between phenomenality and access (P-
consciousness  and  A-consciousness),  between
qualia  and  higher-order  thoughts.  In  this  de-
bate, the issue that seems unsolvable is where
exactly  the  boundary  between  conscious  and
unconscious processing should be laid. 
In such attempts to establish boundaries,
it is perhaps good to start from the extremes,
as an example from zoology will illustrate. Su-
perficially, one could argue about whether a dol-
phin is a fish or a mammal. Science has resolved
that argument by looking at animals that we all
agree are either mammals (such as dogs, cows,
or  monkeys)  or  fish  (such  as  sole,  tuna,  or
piranha). From that perspective, the key differ-
ences between these species lies in the way they
breathe and reproduce.2 Why are these the key
differences? Well, differences in breathing do all
the explaining for why fish are generally more
adept at living in water instead of on land. Sim-
ilarly, evolution towards the land has called for
eggs with protective layers (amnios), as anamni-
otic eggs (that fish lay) cannot survive on land.
The  most  extreme  version  of  that  is  the  in-
trauterine  development  of  the  egg.  Mammals
and fish are thus at the two extreme ends of
evolutionary adaptation towards breathing and
reproducing  on  land.3 We  understand  why  a
mammal behaves differently to a fish from these
key  properties.  From these  key  properties  we
understand why mammals roam the surface of
the earth, why they look the way they look, and
2 Among other things, like whether they maintain body temperature
or have hairy skin.
3 With reptiles and birds in between, laying amniotic eggs on the land.
why they behave the way they do.4 In classify-
ing animals, we use these features for a discrete
taxonomy. This means that there are other fea-
tures that do not qualify as defining character-
istics,  which  are  disregarded  in  animal  tax-
onomy. Among these are behaviours like swim-
ming in water, or living in groups. The key dif-
ferences, obtained from looking at the extreme
ends of  the spectra,  lead us to conclude that
dolphins  are  mammals  and  not  fish,  even
though appearances may suggest otherwise. We
can draw a sharp boundary, and do not have to
resort to saying that dolphins are “fishy mam-
mals”, because we recognize that the swimming
behaviour of dolphins is irrelevant to their tax-
onomy.5 Defining  features and  irrelevant  fea-
tures enables a proper and discrete taxonomy,
making  most  sense  of  all  the  available  data.
Moreover,  a taxonomy based on such features
allows for an understanding that goes towards a
deeper level, in this case the evolutionary pres-
sure that came from the transition from sea to
land dwelling.
I  propose  to  undertake  something  similar
with consciousness. What is the proper taxonomy
of conscious versus unconscious vision? What are
the defining features of this difference, and what
features are irrelevant? And do the defining fea-
tures take us towards a somewhat more funda-
mental  level  of  understanding  consciousness
(Lamme 2010a,  2010b)? To find those features,
we start from the extreme ends: the mammals
and  fish  of  consciousness  research,  the  things
most people will agree on as representing either
conscious or unconscious processing. 
3 The mammals and fish of 
consciousness
When I am awake and say I see a face, am able
to report its identity; I can identify the colour
of its eyes and hair, and judge its emotional ex-
4 Of course there is the occasional mammal that lays eggs (e.g., the
platypus) or fish that give birth to live young (e.g., the hammerhead
shark). Still, calling these mammals or fish depends on the relative
weight of other defining features,  such as  their  way of breathing,
feeding, body temperature maintenance, etc.
5 In a somewhat more mathematical analogy one could take all properties
of all animals in the world, and perform a cluster or factor analysis. A
good taxonomy has clusters that are aligned along the primary factors.
Traditional taxonomy seems to have operated in this way implicitly.
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pression. There is little reason to doubt that I
have a conscious sensation of that face.6 If we
study the properties of visual processing in this
condition, we can be pretty sure we are study-
ing  the  properties  of  conscious  visual  percep-
tion.  This  is  our  “mammal”  of  consciousness.
We  can  study  the  properties  of  this  species
fairly  easily.  We  can  resort  to  introspection,
verbal reports, or more strictly formalized ap-
proaches like detection or discrimination tasks.
In favour of using introspection is that our in-
trospective  idea  of  consciousness  is  the  very
thing we are trying to explain. I would like to
understand  why  the  world  looks  the  way  it
looks in my mind’s eye. This is the explanan-
dum. Even so, we should be cautious in fully
“trusting”  introspection,7 and  that  is  where
more formal approaches may come in handy.
What would be the proper “fish” of con-
sciousness? Are there conditions where everyone
agrees that consciousness is absent? Dreamless
sleep  (Tononi &  Massimini 2008)  and  anaes-
thesia (Alkire et al. 2008) seem to be good can-
didates,  although  not  very  useful  ones,  given
that visual stimuli are difficult to deliver, and
that one can only resort to objective measures
(brain signals) to assess what is still processed
or not.  Awake subjects are easier to assess in
that respect, but there it is hard to find truly
unequivocal  manipulations  of  consciousness.
“Unequivocal” in  this context means that the
manipulation can truly be regarded as a manip-
ulation of consciousness, i.e., in the case of vis-
ion is a manipulation of visibility (Kim & Blake
2005;  Lamme 2006). An example of the latter
6 One could do so, of course, which would lead to the denouncement of
consciousness as a scientific phenomenon altogether, much along the
lines of eliminative materialism (e.g., Churchland 1981). Daniel Den-
nett, in his categorical denouncement of anything coming close to
qualia or even the phenomenology of consciousness, seems to follow a
similar agenda (1993). It is entirely possible indeed that conscious-
ness is a figment of our imagination, one that will evaporate upon
close  scientific  scrutiny.  Something  like  that  happened  to  ‘elan
vital’—the unique property of living matter—once we learned about
chemistry,  biology,  DNA, and natural selection.  For now, let’s  as-
sume that consciousness exists, and is in need of an explanation. If
not, I would rather not be spending my years in neuroscience.
7 One important caveat is that for introspection we have to resort to
cognitive  functions  like  attention,  memory,  and  “internal  report”.
This may result in both a potential underestimation of what we ac-
tually see (see for example the iconic/fragile/working memory discus-
sion), and to an overestimation of what we actually see (as in the il-
lusion of peripheral colour vision). This has been dealt with extens-
ively elsewhere (Lamme 2010a).
would be visual masking (Breitmeyer & Ogmen
2000;  Enns &  Di Lollo 2000).  Here,  a  target
stimulus is presented very briefly, and immedi-
ately  followed by another  stimulus,  known as
the mask. When properly done, this will render
the target completely invisible. People will be at
chance  detecting  presence  or  absence,  or  in
judging another property of the target stimulus.
It is safe to assume invisibility in masking, be-
cause there is no conceivable reason that could
prevent  the  subject  from reporting  his  visual
percept, had he had one: the subject is sitting
there, focussing his full attention to the target
location, ready to push the button as soon as he
sees the target. The not-seeing can therefore not
be attributed to the absence of attention, to a
lapse of memory, or to any other cognitive func-
tion sitting between a potentially conscious sen-
sation  and  its  report  (Lamme 2003,  2010a,
2010b). As we are ready to believe the presence
of consciousness in the case of someone verbally
describing the face he sees, we should be equally
ready to believe its absence in the case of mask-
ing (or dreamless sleep and anaesthesia).8 
Another popular paradigm to render stim-
uli  invisible  is  continuous  flash  suppression
(CFS;  Tsuchiya & Koch 2005. Here, the target
stimulus is shown to one eye, while the other
eye receives a rapid stream of brightly coloured
patches, serving as a mask. This typically res-
ults in the target stimulus being rendered invis-
ible,  although  stimuli  may  “break  through”
after  a  while.9 A  third  paradigm is  dichoptic
masking, where two oppositely coloured stimuli
are shown to the two eyes, that when properly
fused combine into an invisible stimulus (Mout-
8 Note that a proper treatment of response bias is important in this
case. “Shy” subjects may feel inclined to respond “not seen” on most
trials, more liberal subjects may feel inclined to respond “seen” on
most trials. Only treating the responses in terms of signal detection
theory (Swets et al. 1978) can truly establish the absence of any sen-
sation (because the number of false alarms—subjects saying “seen”
on trials without a target—is taken into account). From that per-
spective, using only partially-effective masks is not a proper method,
not even when only those trials are used in which subjects reported
not seeing the target. 
9 A potential  problem with the CFS manipulation is that “time to
breakthrough” is often used as a measure of relative awareness of
stimuli. Time to breakthrough is more or less analogous to a “yes”
response (or hit) in a masking paradigm, and hence can suffer from
response  bias.  CFS  studies  where  responses  are  more  rigorously
treated in terms of signal detection theory are scarce. See Stein et al.
(2011) for a more elaborate discussion on this problem with the CFS
paradigm.
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oussis &  Zeki 2002;  Fahrenfort et  al. 2012).
From  all  the  available  neuropsychological  pa-
tients,  patients  suffering from hemianopia due
to  a  V1  lesion  (often  accompanied  by  blind-
sight)  are  probably  the  clearest  cases  of  im-
paired visual consciousness (Weiskrantz 1996).
I select these consciousness manipulations
because  they  seem  to  be  the  safest  bets  for
highlighting situations where conscious vision is
really absent. The absence of conscious vision in
these cases has purely visual origins. There is
no other function precluding the report of a po-
tentially present visual sensation, as may be the
case in split-brain patients or neglect, or in ma-
nipulations like innattentional blindness, change
blindness,  or  the  attentional  blink  (Lamme
2003).  The  two  extreme  ends—the  mammals
and  fish  of  consciousness—may  serve  as  a
guideline towards establishing the properties of
conscious versus unconscious processing. What
are the differences between awake conscious vis-
ion and vision in sleep, anaesthesia, blindsight,
and the various forms of masking? 
4 Categorization: From low to high level 
features
Above,  I  used  the  example  of  seeing  a  face.
What does seeing a face mean, in terms of the
visual functions being executed? Recognizing a
face first  of  all  entails  that one identifies  the
stimulus  as  belonging  to the  class  “faces”,  as
opposed to any other class of stimuli, such as
“animals”,  “teapots”,  “houses”,  or  “letters”.
This is a process of categorization. Intuitively,
categorization  seems  a  key  property  of  con-
sciously seeing and recognizing a face. It is not,
however. Since the first findings of blindsight it
has been recognized that categorization can oc-
cur fully independently of conscious sensations
(Weiskrantz 1996;  Boyer et al. 2005). Patients
without awareness of stimuli in the blind part of
the visual field can nevertheless categorize these
stimuli, as long as the categorization is framed
in a two-alternative forced choice: is it a square
or a circle, is it moving upwards or downwards,
is it red or green, vertical or horizontal? In such
cases,  patients’  responses fall  well  above mere
chance,  indicating  that  the  categorization  of
stimuli in two distinct classes is still function-
ing, and hence does not necessarily require con-
sciousness.10 
Categorization is the main function of cor-
tical visual neurons, in that each neuron is fea-
ture-selective:  it  only  responds  to  a  stimulus
when that stimulus possesses certain visual fea-
tures. A Nobel prize was awarded for this find-
ing, as it is fundamental to the operation of the
visual cortex (Hubel 1982). It ranges from low
level features such as spatial frequency, orienta-
tion, direction of motion, or colour to higher-
level features such as the geometry of a shape
or the class of an object. Each feature-selective
neuron can be seen as doing a simple, often one-
dimensional  categorization:  it  signals  “vertical
orientation”, “moving upwards”, or “rectangular
shape” (Lamme & Roelfsema 2000). Face-select-
ive  neurons  shout  “face!”  (Oram &  Perrett
1992).  The  categorization  responses  of  visual
neurons are so fundamental to their operation
that  they  are  fully  independent  of  conscious-
ness: most neurons are equally feature selective
in anaesthesia as they are in the awake condi-
tion (Dow et al. 1981;  Snodderly &  Gur 1995;
Lamme et  al. 1998a).  Feature-selective  re-
sponses of neurons are mediated via feedforward
connections, and visual categorization proceeds
along these feedforward connections in an un-
conscious way (Lamme et al. 1998b;  Lamme &
Roelfsema 2000).
Additional evidence dissociating categoriz-
ation from consciousness  comes from a multi-
tude  of  sources.  Unseen  stimuli  in  backward-
masking are also categorized, as can be judged
from  the  specific  priming  effects  they  may
evoke. For example, a fully masked digit 7 may
speed up (or slow down) responses to categoriz-
ing a second digit (or number word) as either
being  above  or  below  5,  showing  that  the
masked and unseen number (the 7) is categor-
ized according to its numeric value (Dehaene et
al. 1998).11 Many  similar  examples  exist.
Moreover, it has been shown that masked and
hence unseen stimuli evoke category-specific re-
sponses from the brain, either in the form of se-
10 Note, however, that categorization is typically far better for stimuli
than patients—or normal subjects—are aware of.
11 Or more precisely: as being either below or above 5, in this experiment.
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lective  single  unit  responses  (Rolls &  Tovee
1994;  Macknik &  Livingstone 1998), or in the
form of selective activation or category-selective
regions such as the Fusiform Face Area (FFA)
(figure 1) (Moutoussis & Zeki 2002; Kouider et
al. 2009),12 or in the Visual Word Form Area
(Dehaene &  Naccache 2001)—indicating  that
they are categorized up to the level of face vs
non-face or word vs non-word (Dehaene et al.
2004). There is a large body of literature cover-
ing  the  unconscious  processing  of  emotional
valence in either faces or words (Straube et al.
2011). 
Particularly  far-reaching  levels  of  uncon-
scious categorization have been reported for be-
haviourally  or  socially  relevant  stimuli.  Tools
evoke selective activation of the dorsal stream
12 It  is  unclear  to  what  level  invisible  faces  are  processed  exactly.
Clearly, face/non-face categorization takes place for masked stimuli
(see below), but whether face identity is also preserved depends on
the exact experiment.  Some find face-identity-specific priming and
suppression of activation of the FFA and related face-selective-re-
gions for backward masked stimuli (Kouider et al. 2009). However,
this effect was only present for famous faces, not for unknown faces,
showing that it may not be identity itself that is processed but “level
of fame” or something similar. Others have made faces invisible using
CFS, and found that face-specific adaptation only occurred for vis-
ible, and not for invisible faces (Moradi et al. 2005). The two studies
are hard to compare, partly because of the different techniques used
to make faces invisible (masking vs. CFS), but mostly because the
latter used an adaptation effect as independent variable. It may be
that unconscious categorization still occurred, yet did not result in
learning (e.g., Meuwese et al. 2013; Meuwese et al. 2014). 
areas—and  selective  priming  effects—when
made invisible with CFS (Fang & He 2005; Al-
meida et al. 2008). Faces that have their eyes
turned  towards  the  viewer  break  from  CFS
sooner than faces that are turned away—a find-
ing that is probably explained by the fact that
faces turned towards the viewer pose a very rel-
evant or even threatening social signal (Gobbini
et al. 2013). Similarly, the gender of naked bod-
ies is processed during CFS (Jiang et al. 2006).
Also, the mismatch between object categories is
identified for stimuli made invisible using CFS:
scenes with mismatching objects (e.g.,  a cook
taking a chess-board out of the oven instead of
a dish) break from CFS sooner than matching
scenes (Mudrik et al. 2011). 
The  latter  finding  is  related  to  various
non-visual “categorization” processes that occur
for  invisible  stimuli:  it  has  been  shown  that
masked  stimuli  travel  throughout  the  brain,
even reaching high-level areas involved in inhib-
itory cognitive control, response error selection,
or  evidence  accumulation,  exerting  high-level
cognitive effects (Van Gaal & Lamme 2012). So
invisible  stimuli  not  only  activate  visual  cat-
egorization  processes,  but  also  activate  ex-
tremely high-level and very abstract categories
such as the stimulus being a “stop signal”, an
“error”, or “evidence for a right button press”.
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Figure 1: Faces and houses were made invisible using dichoptic masking—i.e., presenting oppositely coloured versions
to each eye. Regardless of (in-)visibility, these faces and houses evoked selective activations of category specific regions
of the brain (from: Moutoussis & Zeki 2002).
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From a neural perspective, categorization
is feature selectivity, which may range from very
simple to highly complex features and categor-
ies. This kind of categorization proceeds entirely
independent  of  consciousness.13 So  how  does
conscious recognition differ from categorization?
To  answer  this  question,  we  have  to  take  a
closer look at categorization responses. What a
face-selective cells does, is to categorize a face
as belonging to the class of faces versus non-
faces.  That’s  all.  When  we  consciously  see  a
face, however, we do much more than this: we
classify the stimulus as a face, but at the same
we identify its shape, colour, identity, and emo-
tional  expression.  So  we  distinguish  between
“that  brown  face  of  my  sad-looking  friend
Peter”  and  very  many  other  faces—and  also
between that face and millions of other poten-
tial visual stimuli. 
Gulio Tononi uses  the  metaphor  of  a
photo-diode to illustrate the point (2008, 2012).
For  a  photo-diode  a  black  screen  is  different
from a white screen. That’s a distinction it can
make.  The  photo-diode  carries  information
about the brightness of the screen, so its signal
carries one bit of information (or a few bits, de-
pending  on  its  sensitivity).  For  us,  however,
consciously seeing a black screen is very differ-
ent. Seeing the black screen implies that we dis-
tinguish it from a grey screen, a red screen, a
black table, a green house, a pink face, a dog, a
sound, a feeling, or any other sensory event that
would  have  been  possible.  Consciously  seeing
the black screen thus carries a huge amount of
information, as it excludes an almost endless set
of alternative sensations. And that makes seeing
“that  brown  face  of  my  sad-looking  friend
Peter” very different from what a face-selective
neuron does when it signals “face”. The neuron
behaves  much like  the  photodiode,  in  that  it
signals presence or absence of a feature along a
single dimension. That is because neurons tend
to  combine  feature-selectivity  with  invariance
13 Another illustration of the separation between feature selectivity and
conscious experience is the observation that many neurons signal fea-
tures of which we are not aware: V1 neurons signal the orientation of
gratings that are of too finely spaced for us to perceive (He et al.
1996;  Foster et al. 1985), respond to 3D disparity where we do not
see depth (Cumming & Parker 1997), or signal invisible temporal fre-
quencies (such as the flickering of light beyond the flicker-fusion fre-
quency of about 15–25Hz, Maier et al. 1987).
for  other  features:  a  face-selective  cell  signals
faces regardless of colour, size, identity or ex-
pression (Rolls 1992).14
Tononi proceeds from a photo-diode to the
photo camera as a metaphor for explaining an-
other  central  feature  of  conscious  sensations
(2004,  2008,  2012). He argues that the critical
difference between a conscious representation in
the human mind and what happens in a camera
is that in the camera information is distributed
and not integrated. Each and every pixel signals
a particular level of luminosity, but it does so
entirely on its own. It does not “know” what
other pixels are doing. To the camera it would
not matter if all the pixels were cut apart and
became separate cameras. Conscious sensations,
on the other hand, are integrated. 
It thus seems that to find for visual opera-
tions that are more closely linked to conscious-
ness, we must look for something beyond basic
categorization. We must look at processes where
the individual pixels in our camera—the billions
of neurons each signalling particular features—
are  interacting,  and  are  integrating  their  in-
formation. 
5 Interference: A loss of independence 
The pixels in the “camera of the human mind” do
not work independently. A strong case in point
are illusory brightness or colour shifts. Patches of
the exact same brightness may be perceived as
entirely different,  depending on their  surround-
ings, and depending on the global configuration of
brightness and contrast. A striking example is the
cylinder with checkerboard illusion shown in the
right half of figure 2. Similar illusions exist in the
domain of colour (figure 2, left). Relatedly, every-
one who has ever tried to paint a picture has ex-
perienced  that  it  takes  an  astonishingly  rich
palette of reds, purples, browns, yellows, and even
greens or blues to construe a veridical depiction of
a simple red apple. The unitary experience of see-
14 Responses  are  modulated  by  such  features,  but  typically  this
happens only after some delay (Sugase et al. 1999). The initial
feedforward response  is  typically fully governed by a basic  fea -
ture, like face vs non-face. Later on, responses are modulated by
face identity or expression, and this is mediated by horizontal or
recurrent  interactions  between  neurons.  We then  enter  the  do-
main of feature integration, which is a hallmark of conscious re-
cognition; see below. 
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ing a red apple is in fact composed of the detec-
tion of a multitude of wavelengths, all interacting
to compose that one colour. Only with extreme
focused scrutiny (or by covering surrounding ele-
ments) are we able to isolate the elements that
make up our unitary conscious experiences.
Another illustration is the phenomenon of
colour constancy. When we look at a bowl of
fruit in the blue morning light the spectral com-
position of wavelengths reflected from the fruits
is  very different from the wavelengths coming
from the fruits at sunset (figure  3). Neverthe-
less, we see the banana or the apple as having
the  same colour  whether  it  is  dusk  or  dawn.
Our  visual  system  is  not  interested  in  the
wavelength coming from fruits; it is interested
in their potential taste or edibility. Therefore, it
discounts the illumination, and computes “col-
our”, which is a property of the object, rather
than of the light coming from it.15 Colour is not
wavelength; colour is a meaningful property of
15 It probably discounts the illumination by very much the same mech-
anisms as the illusory brightness shifts discussed above (via inhibit-
ory lateral interactions). However, precise neural mechanisms may be
different, as might be the cortical level at which neural responses re-
flect colour rather than wavelength.
objects that is based on wavelengths, yet tran-
scends it.
To what extent do these phenomena de-
pend  on  consciousness?  Harris et al. (2011)
studied a brightness illusion much like that in
figure  2. Two circles were shown, of either the
same or different brightness.  By placing these
circles in a dark and bright surround respect-
ively, their brightness suffered from an illusory
shift.  In  the  critical  condition,  the  surrounds
were made invisible by presenting them to one
eye,  and filling the other eye with a continu-
ously flashing Mondrian stimulus. This resulted
in  CFS  of  the  surrounds.  Cleverly,  the  two
circles  were  shown in  both  eyes,  so  remained
visible  throughout.  Regardless  of  the  CFS-in-
duced invisibility of  the surrounds, the circles
still showed illusory brightness shifts.16
The  neural  mechanisms  of  illusory
brightness perception were studied extensively
16 It must be noted that in this experiment, the surrounds were not al-
ways fully invisible. In 86% of the trials, subjects reported not seeing
the surrounds. Only these trials were used for the analysis. Within
these trials, discrimination of the background (is the darker half left
or right?) was at chance level, leading to the argument that indeed
there was a full absence of awareness of the surround.
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Figure 2: Two strong shifts in the perception of colour and brightness. Although the indicated patches are identical,
they  are perceived as  having quite  different  colour  and brightness.  Visit  Michael  Bach’s  website  (http://michael-
bach.de/ot/) for these and many other examples.
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in the macaque monkey and cat visual cortex.
It was found that perceived brightness (modu-
lated  by  flanking  regions)  influenced  neural
responses  in  area  V1 of  the  cat,  but  not  at
earlier  stages  such  as  the  LGN or  the  optic
tract,  thereby showing a  gradual  progression
from physical brightness to perceptual bright-
ness in the visual pathways (Rossi & Paradiso
1999;  Rossi et al. 1996). Using the Cornsweet
brightness illusion,17 it was found that in the
monkey’s  visual  cortex,  V2  cells  represents
surface  brightness  whereas  V1  cells  do  not,
pushing  the  level  at  which  perceived  bright-
ness is calculated somewhat higher (Roe et al.
2005). Either way, these results were recorded
in anaesthetized animals, showing their inde-
pendence from consciousness.
How the visual system goes from the de-
tection  of  wavelength  towards  the  representa-
tion of colour is still a topic of controversy. Ini-
tially, there was thought to be a modular pro-
gression from V1 cells encoding wavelength to-
wards V4 cells encoding colour. That view was
challenged by various findings showing that the
responses  of  V1  cells  are  influenced  by  sur-
rounding hues. The view that V4 is the “colour
module”  has also  been challenged,  in  part  by
strong disagreement on the homology between
monkey V4 and alleged human counterparts.18
Moreover,  the  coding  of  colour  is  intricately
17 In this illusion, two surfaces of identical brightness are perceived as
having different brightness, because there is a contrast edge between
them. 
18 I am not even going to dare mentioning their names here.
linked to the coding of object shape, and hence
can no longer be viewed as a simple “add-on” to
our visual percept.19 It is now thought that the
perception of colour depends on the interaction
between neuronal groups, or is best understood
as a population code (Shapley & Hawken 2011).
Given  this  controversy,  it  is  difficult  to
know to what extent colour perception depends
on  consciousness.  Many  of  the  recordings  in
monkey visual cortex were performed in awake
animals, some in anaesthetized animals (Shap-
ley &  Hawken 2011). A clear-cut difference in
results between the two conditions is hard to es-
tablish. A remarkable finding is that blindsight
patients report no conscious sensation of colour,
yet  may  have  spectral  sensitivity  curves  that
have a similar shape in the lesioned and intact
hemi-fields  (Stoerig &  Cowey 1989).  Spectral
sensitivity  is,  however,  mostly  carried  by
wavelength. Similarly, patients with cortical col-
our  blindness  (achromatopsia)  do  not  con-
sciously perceive colour, yet can detect objects
or  patterns  based  on  wavelength  contrasts
(Cowey &  Heywood 1997).  Colour  constancy
mechanisms, on the other hand, are absent in
the  lesioned  hemi-field  of  blindsight  patients
(Barbur et al. 2004; Barbur & Spang 2008), and
19 The fact that black-and-white photography works so well, has led us
to believe that colour is a feature that is “painted” onto objects, as a
sort of extra, independent of any other feature. We are now coming
around from this view. For example, to compute the colour of an ob-
ject, the object’s shape has to be taken into account, otherwise shad-
ings would be misinterpreted. Object identity also influences colour
perception: a brownish colour on a banana will be seen as more yel-
low than it would on a tomato. 
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Figure 3: These images show a bowl of fruit photographed in three lighting conditions—artificial light (left), hazy day-
light (middle), and clear blue sky (right). Notice the marked variation in colour balance caused by the spectral proper -
ties of the illuminant. We are not normally aware of this variation because colour constancy mechanisms discount illu-
mination effects (image and legend from http://www.psypress.co.uk/mather/resources/topic.asp?topic=ch12-tp-04).
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hence seem more closely linked to conscious per-
ception.20 
The difference between perceived colour and
wavelength, and its relation to conscious vision,
has been directly addressed in a masked priming
experiment.  In  this  experiment,  subjects  were
shown desaturated blue, green, or white coloured
disks. Perceptually, the white was closer to the
blue disk. From the point of view of the phosphor
activations on the monitor screen, on which the
disks were shown (i.e., their “wavelength composi-
tion”), the white disk was, however, closer to the
green disk. What was studied was the effects of
these disks when they acted as primes for a sub-
sequent colour discrimination. It was found that
masked,  and hence  invisible  white  disks,  acted
more like green primes than like blue ones. Visible
white disks, on the other hand, acted more like
blue primes than like green ones (Breitmeyer et
al. 2004; Breitmeyer et al. 2007). Apparently, un-
conscious priming acts on wavelength similarity,
20 This argument is, however, weakened by the fact that other long-
range colour interactions remain in the blind hemi-field (Barbur et
al. 2004), and by the finding that colour constancy mechanisms may
depend  on  fairly  early,  monocular  mechanisms  (Barbur &  Spang
2008). Moreover, it is reckoned that several colour constancy mech-
anisms exist, some of which are based on retinal adaptation mechan-
isms (Kamermans et al. 1998). 
whereas conscious priming acts on perceived col-
our similarity.
All in all, it remains difficult to assess the
relation between consciousness and phenomena
like brightness or perceived colour illusions, or
mechanisms  related  to  colour  constancy.  Per-
ceived  brightness  seems  to  depend  on  largely
unconscious mechanisms, and on fairly low level
and  short  range  mechanisms.  The  transition
from wavelength analysis  to the perception of
colour is more likely to accompany the trans-
ition from unconscious processing to conscious
vision. A firm conclusion, however, relies upon
settling the debate about mechanisms of colour
perception  and  their  neural  substrates  in  hu-
mans and animals, and more direct experiment-
ation on how these mechanisms are affected by
manipulations of consciousness.21 
6 Inference: Beyond the input
In the phenomenon of colour constancy we have
already seen a hint of another visual function.
21 Obviously, these empirical issues about colour perception and con-
sciousness have very direct consequences for many philosophical de-
bates as well, given the many thought experiments that rely on col-
our perception and the whole notion of qualia.
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Figure 4: Left: the Kanizsa triangle. Note the illusory brightness increase inside the region of the illusory triangle.
Middle: the 2D projection of a cube can in fact originate from a multitude of 3D objects. We regularly interpret it as a
cube, however. Right: we see the woman as small, despite our cognitive ability to realize that “this cannot be true”. Our
3D “priors” force us to see her as small (from https://richardwiseman.wordpress.com/2009/09/09/great-table-illusion/).
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Colour  is  not  about  the  wavelength  coming
from objects. It is a property of objects that we
infer  from  wavelengths.  At  some  point,  con-
scious  perception  starts  to  diverge  from  the
mere physical properties of the input, in a pro-
cess we call inference. There are many more ex-
amples of inference, and many visual illusions
capitalize on the fact that our visual mechan-
isms are constantly trying to make sense of the
world. Figure  4 shows the famous Kanizsa tri-
angle. The minimal, strictly physical interpreta-
tion of the image is that of three Pac men poin-
ted at each other and three arrowheads pointing
outwards.  But  our  perceptual  interpretation
goes beyond this, in that we see a white triangle
hovering over three black circles, occluding an-
other outlined triangle. The illusory triangle is
seen as slightly brighter than its surround, and
illusory contours mark its “borders”. 
This process of inference seems to strongly
fit the intuitive difference between a camera and
conscious vision. It  requires the integration of
multiple “pixels”, their interaction, and their in-
terpretation  beyond  what  is  strictly  given  by
the image itself. And it is in this last aspect in
particular that prior knowledge about the world
comes into play, and starts to interfere with the
stimulus-driven  feature-selective  categorization
of the input.
The Kanizsa triangle can be seen as a spe-
cific example of the more general propensity of
the visual system to arrive at a representation
of  surfaces  in  3D space  (also  called the  2.5D
sketch). In that representation we seek the most
natural interpretation, consistent with our exist-
ing experience of how things are in the world. It
is simply much more likely that there is a tri-
angle covering circles than that there are three
Pac men that happen to be facing each other at
exactly 60o angles. The triangle interpretation is
generic, whereas the Pac men one would be ac-
cidental (Albert & Hoffman 2000). Nakayama &
Shimojo (1992) studied various configurations of
3D stimuli, and found that our visual system al-
ways strives towards the interpretation that is
most generic, i.e.,  that would least depend on
an accidental viewing position of the observer.
Interpretations that would not change when the
observer  happened  to  shift  position  are  fa-
voured, given that we are constantly moving re-
lative to objects. For example, the 2D image of
a cube can in fact arise from an infinite number
of shapes (figure 4, middle), yet we tend to fa-
vour the “cube” interpretation because it is the
most generic one. 
Another way of putting it would be to say
that  the  cube interpretation  fits  our  common
experience, in that most of the time, these kinds
of 2D projections arise from regular 3D cubes: it
is the most ecologically valid interpretation. In
a modern guise, this aspect of inference is form-
alized as a Bayesian approach, where vision uses
a set of prior probabilities to arrive at the most
likely  3D  interpretation  of  a  2D  image.  The
cube  has  the  highest  prior,  compared  to  the
more irregular  shapes.  Illusions like the Ames
room  (where  someone  changes  size  when  he
walks from one corner to the other), or the size
illusion shown in figure  4 (right) capitalize on
these assumptions: we assume that rooms have
rectangular floors and walls, we assume the wo-
man is sitting on a chair. These assumptions are
so  strongly  embedded  in  our  visual  hardware
that even in the face of strange consequences,
such  as  people  growing  in  size  within  a  few
steps or a man holding his hand over a mini-wo-
man, this inference is maintained.
Many  more  illusions  display  non-veridical
inferences.  In the Ebbinghaus illusion, the per-
ceived size of a disk depends on the size of sur-
rounding disks. In the Ponzo and Müller-Leyer il-
lusions we see line segments as having different
lengths, while in fact they are the same. These il-
lusions show that the size of an object is an infer-
ence that we draw from its context, rather than
from the space it occupies on the retina. 
To what extent does inference depend on
conscious vision? When we have to pick up the
disks in the Ebbinghaus illusion, it appears that
our hands open at a pre-grip aperture that is in
accordance with the disk’s actual size, not its per-
ceptual size. Apparently, size context effects influ-
ence  perception,  and  not  automatic  action—
which has led to the idea that we have two largely
separate neural pathways, one transforming visual
input  into  conscious  perception,  and  the  other
translating visual input into automatically guided
action (Goodale & Milner 1992).
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There is more evidence linking perceptual
inference to conscious vision. Harris (Harris et
al. 2011)  studied  whether  Kanizsa  triangles
were still inferred when the inducers were made
invisible using CFS. The same setup was used
that showed the presence of brightness illusions
under CFS (see above). Subjects had to indicate
whether the triangle in the suppressed eye was
pointing left or right. They were at chance level,
indicating that  the Kanizsa-type inference de-
pends  on  consciousness.  Another  study,  how-
ever,  found  that  Kanizsa  triangles  broke
through CFS earlier than control stimuli with
inducers pointed outwards (Wang et al. 2012),
suggesting that Kanizsa-type inference does oc-
cur pre-consciously.
At the single neuron level, the detection
of illusory contours has been studied quite ex-
tensively. Initially, it was found that V2 cells
respond in an orientation-selective manner to
Kanizsa-type illusory contours (Von der Heydt
et al. 1984). More recently, other areas have
been shown to be involved as well (Sáry et al.
2008)—area  V4  in  particular  (Cox et  al.
2013). And in human neuroimaging studies it
was found that Kanizsa-type illusory contours
activate  many  early  visual  areas  (Seghier &
Vuilleumier 2006).  All  these  studies  used
awake animals or humans, so it is difficult to
infer whether  these responses depend on the
conscious state. 
Marcel  studied the  processing  of  illusory
triangles  in  two  blindsight  patients.  Two  in-
ducers were presented in the sighted hemi-field,
while one critical inducer was presented in the
blind  field,  either  completing  the  triangle  or
not.  Completed  triangles  were  detected  far
above chance (~80%), while the detection of the
inducer shape was at chance. Moreover, one of
the subjects described the illusory triangles as
“brighter”, “out there on the screen” and “on
top of something” (Marcel 1998).
All  in all,  the relation between inference
and  consciousness  is  unclear,  mostly  because
fairly little work has been done as yet to study
the relation directly (i.e., to study the effect of
consciousness  manipulations  on  inference  and
its neural correlate), but also because much of
the work that has been done focuses on a single
(though very important) phenomenon: the Kan-
izsa triangle.
7 Integration: Feature grouping and 
segregation
Both  in  interference  phenomena  such  as
brightness or colour shifts and in inference phe-
nomena like the Kanizsa triangle we see some
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Figure 5: On the left, we see a textured square overlying a textured background. This is because we automatically
group all line segments with the same orientation into one object, and segregate it from the line segments with the or -
thogonal orientation. The small circle represents the receptive field of a V1 neuron, that would not be able to differenti-
ate between the “figure” and the “background” stimulus, because the line segments within that receptive field are
identical. Indeed, V1 responses are identical up to about 100ms after stimulus onset. Beyond that, the two responses
start to diverge, however, indicating that the response of the V1 neuron is modulated by the perceptual context of what
is within its receptive field (Lamme 1995; Lamme et al. 2000). 
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aspects of the integration of information. Visual
responses go beyond the encoding of individual
pixels, and start to influence each other, either
on the basis of more or less hardwired lateral in-
teractions, or on the basis of the incorporation
of prior knowledge. In the end, conscious vision
seems  to  be  about  reaching  full integration.22
We have one visual percept, where all informa-
tion is combined.23 This is  a property of con-
scious vision that has interested scientists for a
long  time.  Gestalt  psychologists  formulated  a
multitude of laws, along which image elements
may be combined into larger wholes (Rock &
Palmer 1990;  Wagemans et  al. 2012).  In  this
grouping  process,  all  features,  together  with
their interactions, inferences, and meanings are
combined into a final percept: the thing we see,
the whole scene containing shapes, objects, and
backgrounds. This is a highly dynamic process
in which various Gestalt laws may compete for
one interpretation or another, and where subtle
changes may influence the meaning of pixels at
long distances. We enter the domain of feature
integration, grouping, binding and segregation.
In short; the domain of perceptual organization.
Two levels  of  integration  may be  distin-
guished,  where  a  subdivision  between  “base
groupings” and “incremental groupings” may be
useful  (Roelfsema 2006).  Base  groupings  are
those that depend on the fact that some feature
combinations  automatically  ride  together.  An
orientation-selective  cell  in  the  primary visual
cortex, for example, is often at the same time
22 Tononi similarly argues that consciousness always strives for “max-
ima of integrated information”, for which he uses the metaphor of
the internet (2012). Like the brain, the internet is a highly intercon-
nected structure where information travels from one part to other
parts. In contrast to the brain, however, the internet is designed to
transfer information from one specific part of the net (computer A)
to a specified other part of the net (computer B), and it would in
fact be rather counterproductive if this information were influenced
by other information flowing from computers C to D or E to F. At
another moment information may flow from A to C or D or F. The
internet therefore does not strive for “maxima of integrated informa-
tion”, whereas the brain typically does. Focussed attention, in such a
view,  would  then  be  in  fact  a  mechanism  that  counters  this
propensity towards maximally-integrated information, and which en-
ables the brain to operate more strongly along the principles of the
internet.
23 This is in fact such a strong intuition that it has led us to believe for
a  long  time  that  consciousness  must  be  some place  in  the  brain
“where it all comes together”. Descartes envisaged the pineal gland
as such a place, and hence theories that lean towards such an explan-
ation of consciousness are often said to suffer from the fallacy of the
“Cartesian theatre”. 
also direction-selective. It may be tuned to par-
ticular binocular disparities as well. And it will
have a limited receptive field. So the firing of
that neuron already goes beyond a one-dimen-
sional feature-detector, beyond the photo-diode.
It signals an orientation, moving in a particular
direction, at a particular 3D depth, and located
in  some  part  of  the  visual  field.  Such  base
groupings exist for many feature combinations,
such as colour and shape (e.g., V4 cells), or mo-
tion and disparity (e.g., middle temporal, MT,
cells). 
Another type of base grouping is visible in
the feature selectivity of a particular cell, where
we may recognize the combination of feature-se-
lectivity of cells at earlier levels. From the start,
Hubel  and  Wiesel  recognized  that  orientation
selectivity could be viewed as a convergence of
information from retinal ganglion cells lying in
a row. The feedforward convergence of informa-
tion from orientation selective simple cells leads
to the receptive field structure of complex cells,
which  are  orientation  and  direction  selective
(Hubel &  Wiesel 1968). Many higher-level fea-
ture-selective cells can be seen as converging in-
formation from lower level cells (Tanaka 1996). 
Base  grouping  does  not  depend  on  con-
sciousness. The combined feature selectivity of
neurons, as well as high-level feature selectivity
based on the feedforward convergence of lower-
level feature selectivity are still present in an-
aesthesia  or  masking  (Lamme &  Roelfsema
2000; Roelfsema 2006).
Of a very different nature are “incremental
groupings”. Here, the information from separate
neurons has to be combined to obtain a higher
level categorization. A good example is texture
based figure-ground segregation, shown in figure
5 (Lamme 1995;  Zipser et al. 1996). Here, we
automatically perceive a textured square overly-
ing a textured background. This is entirely due
to the fact that the centre square is made up of
line segments of a particular orientation, differ-
ent from the line segments that make up the
background. There is no luminance difference or
any other cue that gives the square “away”. Line
segments  of  one  orientation  are  automatically
grouped into a coherent surface—the square—
that  is  segregated  from  the  surface  that  is
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formed by line segments of the other orientation
—the background. Orientation-selective neurons
in  V1  typically  have  small  receptive  fields,
which would only cover a small part of either
the figure or background. The grouping of line
segments  into  coherent  surfaces,  segregating
from each other, requires the integration of in-
formation from a large set of separate V1 cells.
This  constitutes  “incremental  grouping”
(Lamme & Roelfsema 2000; Roelfsema 2006). 
The neural basis of the integration of im-
age  elements  into  larger  units,  and  the  sub-
sequent segregation of such units into figure and
ground  has  been  studied  extensively  at  the
single unit level, both in anesthetized and awake
monkeys. The key finding is that of “contextual
modulation”, where the response of a neuron to
a particular feature within its receptive field is
modulated by the larger perceptual context of
that feature (Lamme 1995;  Zipser et al. 1996;
Lamme et al. 1999). In the example of figure 5,
the small circle represents a V1 receptive field,
which typically has a size of ~1 degree of visual
angle. From the “point of view” of that recept-
ive field, there is no difference between the “fig-
ure”  or  the  “background”  stimulus:  in  both
cases, identical line segments cover the receptive
field, and if the neuron were just signalling the
presence of this feature (“left diagonal orienta-
tion  present”),  the  responses  of  this  neuron
should be identical for the two stimuli. Indeed
they are, as shown in the panel on the right,
showing fully overlapping responses, until ~100
ms after stimulus onset. At that point, however,
the responses for figure and background start to
diverge. Apparently, information on the context
of the line segments starts to influence the re-
sponse,  so  that  the response is  larger  for the
“figure”  than  for  the  “background”  context
(Lamme 1995).
These kinds of figure-ground modulations
follow the perceptual interpretation of scenes to
a large extent. For example, when figure-ground
relationships  are  ambiguous,  or  reversed,  the
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Figure 6: Contextual modulation of V1 responses follows the global perceptual interpretation of images. In all cases,
the V1 receptive field is stimulated with the exact same line segments. When these line segments belong to a homogen-
ous background texture, a response indicated by the thin line is given. Left: when the line segments belong to a figure
that is defined by differences in disparity, colour, or luminance, the responses are larger. Right: differences in 3D dispar-
ity were used so that the patch of texture was either part of a figure square “floating in a moat behind it” or in the
background with a “frame” hovering in front of it. The contextual modulation always followed these perceptual inter -
pretations, in that “figure” interpretations always evoked larger responses (Zipser et al. 1996).
www.open-mind.net
modulation follows the globally-organized per-
cept, rather than local orientation differences or
gradients (figure  6, right panel)  (Zipser et  al.
1996; Lamme & Spekreijse 2000). 
The  perceptual  grouping  of  image  ele-
ments into larger units follows certain rules and
principles,  the  formulation  of  which  was  the
largest contribution of the Gestalt psychologists
to  modern  vision  theory  (Wagemans et  al.
2012). Among these Gestalt laws of perceptual
organization  are  “similarity”  (elements  that
look alike will be grouped), “common fate” (ele-
ments that go together in time, e.g., move to-
gether, will be grouped), “proximity” (elements
that  are  close  together  will  be  grouped),  and
“good continuation” (elements that lie along a
smooth line will be grouped). Contextual modu-
lation of V1 neurons behaves according to these
rules,  in  that  elements  that  share  luminance,
colour,  disparity,  orientation,  direction  of  mo-
tion, or co-linearity induce facilitatory interac-
tions (figure 6 & 7) (Lamme et al. 1993; Lamme
1995;  Kapadia et al. 1995;  Zipser et al. 1996;
Lamme et al. 2000). 
How does  Gestalt  grouping  and segrega-
tion depend on consciousness? To some extent,
contextual modulation seems to survive during
anaesthesia. This is, however, largely limited to
fairly short range interactions between neurons,
barely beyond or entirely within the receptive
field  (Allman et  al. 1985;  Gilbert &  Wiesel
1992;  Nothdurft et al. 1999). More long-range
interactions, and interactions that express more
global scene interpretations can only be recor-
ded in awake monkeys (Knierim &  Van Essen
1992; Lamme 1995; Kapadia et al. 1995; Zipser
et al. 1996). For example, the figure-ground spe-
cific modulation of V1 responses shown in fig-
ures 5 and 6 (and structure from motion defined
figure–ground modulation) is fully absent when
monkeys are anaesthetized. At the same time,
the orientation and motion selectivity of these
neurons (i.e., their ability to categorize certain
features)  is  not  affected at all  (Lamme et  al.
1998a).
Similarly, backward masking disrupts fig-
ure–ground modulation. In monkeys, the visibil-
ity of texture orientation defined figure-ground
targets  was  manipulated  by  masking  with  a
stimulus consisting of randomly-positioned tex-
ture-defined figures (figure 8). The animals were
at chance in detecting the location of the target
figure for stimulus-onset asynchronie (SOA) of
up to 50 ms (i.e., 50 ms between the onset of
the  target  figure  and  the  mask).  At  larger
SOA’s, behaviour quickly rose to ceiling. Figure-
ground  contextual  modulation  followed  the
same pattern: absent up to and including SOA’s
of  50  ms,  and  increasingly  present  at  longer
latencies. At the shorter latencies, however, V1
neurons  still  responded vigorously  to the tex-
ture patterns in an orientation-selective manner,
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Figure 7: Contour grouping. In all cases shown here, oriented image elements are grouped together to form either a
line (left), a circle (center), or an animal (right). They group according to the Gestalt principles of proximity, similarity,
and colinearity. These stimuli were also used in neurophysiological experiments, typically showing that elements that
group and segregate evoke larger neural responses than isolated or background elements.
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showing that lower level classification was still
present for unseen orientations (Lamme et al.
2002). Similar results were obtained in human
subjects using EEG responses (Fahrenfort et al.
2007).
Contour grouping, as displayed in figure 7,
is  particularly  susceptible  to  masking.  When
these displays are temporally alternated, so that
each element rotates 900 in successive displays,
a strong masking effect is observed.24 Depending
on the angle between elements forming a con-
tour,  visibility  drops  to  chance  at  alternation
frequencies  between 12 and 1Hz.  This  implies
that  the  integration  of  these  contours  takes
between 80 to 1000 ms (Hess et al. 2001). 
Zipser  used  dichoptic  masking  to  render
orientation-defined  figures  invisible.  Figure-
24 This manipulation is a combination of backward and forward mask-
ing, and also somewhat reminiscent of dichoptic masking, in that in
subsequent displays images with the opposite orientation contrast are
shown. See the two images of figure 9, but then not presented to the
two eyes but in rapid alternation.
ground stimuli like those of figure 5 were shown
to the two eyes of awake and fixating monkeys,
yet with opposite orientations in either eye. As
a result, the dichoptically-fused image consisted
of cross-like elements, in which a figure was no
longer visible.25 Figure-ground modulation was
absent in this case (Zipser et al. 1996). In a sim-
ilar experiment in human subjects,  Fahrenfort
used face stimuli that were defined by oriented
texture differences. A face was present in each
image presented to the two eyes. Yet when bin-
ocularly combined, the face disappeared in the
fused percept. He compared the neural signals
obtained for such stimuli to responses to similar
stimuli where binocular fusion resulted in a vis-
25 A similar setup was used in the curious case of alleged “blindsight in
normal observers”. In one of the experiments in that paper, target
figures were made invisible using the same manipulation of dichoptic
presentation of orthogonally-oriented elements. It was claimed that
despite their subjective invisibility, subjects were able to localize the
targets above chance, just as blindsight patients do for unseen stim-
uli (Kolb & Braun 1995). The findings were not replicated, however
(Robichaud & Stelmach 2003).
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Figure 8: Left, above: textured figure-ground squares (like shown in figure 5) were presented either left or right of the
fixation spot, and monkeys had to indicate their position with an eye movement. The figure targets were masked with a
pattern of randomly-positioned texture squares. Left, below: the graphs show—for different SOA’s—the ability of mon-
keys to correctly identify the position of the squares (line graph) versus the strength of either orientation-selective re-
sponses or figure-ground modulation (bars). Monkeys do not see the figures at SOA’s of up to 3 frames (~50ms), and
likewise, contextual modulation is absent in those cases, whereas orientation selectivity is not (Lamme et al. 2002).
Right: monkeys had to indicate the presence or absence of textured figure targets by making an eye movement or delib-
erately maintaining fixation. When figures were not seen, contextual modulation was absent (Supèr et al. 2001). 
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ible face (figure  9) (Fahrenfort et al. 2012). A
striking finding was that visibility (although rig-
orously checked behaviourally) had no effect on
the ability of the Fusiform face area to distin-
guish between face and non-face stimuli,  once
more  corroborating  the  independence  of  cat-
egorization responses and consciousness. In ad-
dition, invisible face stimuli could be classified
from neural responses when training the classi-
fier on visible stimuli and vice versa. The differ-
ence  between  visible  and  invisible  binocular
faces  was found in the fact  that  visible  faces
evoked  strong  recurrent  interactions  between
the FFA and earlier visual areas, both expressed
in  the  fMRI  signal  (assessed  using  psycho-
physiological interaction analysis with the FFA
as a seed), as well as in the EEG signal (show-
ing a larger amount of theta, beta and gamma
synchronization,  and  the  presence  of  figure-
ground  modulation  only  in  the  visible  condi-
tion). 
The most direct relation between contex-
tual modulation and consciousness was perhaps
demonstrated by  Supèr et al. (2001). Monkeys
were shown oriented texture figure-ground tar-
gets  at  different  locations,  and  had  to  signal
their presence by making an eye movement to-
wards their positions. Importantly, however, in
20% of the trials, no figure was presented at all,
and the monkeys had to maintain fixation on
those catch trials for the duration of the stimu-
lus.26 Indeed the monkeys refrained from making
eye  movements  on  catch  trials  (as  they  were
trained to do). But also on some 8% of trials in
which a figure  was presented they maintained
fixation, as if to say “I did not see a stimulus
here”.  There  was  a  striking  difference  in  the
level of  contextual modulation for seen versus
not-seen  figure  targets:  modulation  was  fully
absent for not-seen figures (figure 8). Seemingly,
on some trials contextual interactions spontan-
26 This paradigm has been shown to distinguish between seen and not-seen
stimuli in monkeys with a V1 lesion in one hemi-field, and was used to
differentiate between “conscious” visual responses and unconscious blind-
sight behaviour: without catch trials (i.e., when in forced choice mode),
monkeys react to both stimuli in the intact and in the lesioned field, ex-
pressing blindsight capabilities. In catch trials, however, monkeys only re-
spond to stimuli in the intact and not in the lesioned hemi-field, as if ex-
pressing conscious sensation instead of a mere reflex (Moore et al. 1995).
Supèr et al. used the same paradigm in intact monkeys to assess con-
scious percepts of figure–ground stimuli.
eously fail to develop, and the result is that fig-
ure targets were invisible.27
That brings us to the question of neural
mechanisms. Seemingly, the visual functions of
perceptual organization, grouping according to
Gestalt laws, and figure-ground segregation all
depend strongly on the conscious state, and on
the objective (or subjective) visibility and per-
ceptual interpretation of the stimulus. Do these
functions  have  similar  neural  mechanisms?
There has been much debate on the neural con-
nections  underlying  contextual  modulation  ef-
fects. Given the latency of the effects (typically
several milliseconds after the initial categoriza-
tion or feature response) it was originally hypo-
thesized that they depended on feedback signals
from higher-level visual areas (e.g., V4, IT, MT,
etc.) toward lower levels (e.g., V1, Zipser et al.
1996). Experiments using cooling or lesioning of
higher-level areas gave mixed results. Local in-
activation of V2 using GABA injections had no
effect on short- to medium-range contextual ef-
fects  in  V1  (Hupé et  al. 2001).  Cooling  area
V5/MT, on the other hand, had effects on fig-
ure-ground signals in V1, V2, and V3 (Hupé et
al. 1998). These effects, however, worked on the
early part of the response, and were evoked us-
ing stimuli where segregation depended more on
contrast differences than on the long-range in-
tegration  of  information  (Bullier et  al. 2001).
Others  also  found  figure-ground  effects  that
were faster than those discussed here (Sugihara
et al. 2011). There is thus a whole range of con-
textual  effects,  some of  which are faster  than
others, and some of which may depend on feed-
back while others do not.
There is one counterintuitive aspect of in-
terpreting  these  results  in  this  way:  in  fact,
feedback connections are not slow, but just as
fast as feedforward connections, where both are
at  about  3.5  m/s  (Girard et  al. 2001).  Hori-
zontal  connections  that  run  via  unmyelinated
fibres in layers 2 and 3 of the cortex are about
10 times slower (Sugihara et al. 2011). Many of
the Gestalt principles of perceptual organization
27 A later investigation into  neural  activity  preceding  either  seen or
not-seen figure  trials  showed that  not-seen trials  are  preceded by
somewhat lower level of spontaneous activity, and also express less
inter-neuronal  synchrony (Supèr et  al. 2003;  Van der Togt et al.
2006). 
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are, however, embedded in these slow horizontal
connections: V1 cells with a similar orientation
preference are selectively interconnected via so-
called patchy horizontal fibres. Moreover, these
interconnections are strongest for oriented cells
that  have  their  receptive  fields  aligned  along
their orientation preference. Horizontal connec-
tions  are  also  strongest  between  nearby  cells
(Gilbert &  Wiesel 1989;  Malach et  al. 1993;
Bosking et al. 1997). As such, these horizontal
connections thus form the neural  substrate of
the well know Gestalt rules of “similarity”, “co-
linearity”, and “proximity”. A similar arrange-
ment  of  preferred  interconnectivity  has  been
found for motion-direction selective cells in MT
(Ahmed et  al. 2012),  potentially  forming  the
substrate of the grouping principle of “common
fate”.  Neurophysiological  correlates  of  these
grouping principles are relatively fast, however
(Knierim &  Van  Essen 1992;  Kapadia et  al.
1995).
The  figure-ground  segregation  effects  of
figures  5,  6,  7,  and  8 are  among the  longest
latency contextual  effects  reported.  That may
be because they depend on both horizontal and
feedback connections. Figure  10 shows the res-
ult of an experiment where the complete peri-
striate belt of visual cortex surrounding V1 and
V2 was subjected to suction lesioning, removing
(parts of) areas V3, V3A, V4, V4t, MT, MST,
FST, PM, DP,  and 7a (Lamme et  al. 1998b;
Supèr &  Lamme 2007).  Before  the  lesion,  an
oriented texture figure–ground stimulus evoked
elevated  activity  in  all  neurons  responding  to
the figure elements.  Response modulation was
even somewhat stronger, and occurred earlier at
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Figure 9: Top left: texture-defined faces were presented in either eye of subjects, yet with different orientations of line
segments. As a result, the face was not visible in the fused percept (compare manipulation of figure 1). By using other
orientation combinations, the same design could also result in a visible face (not shown). Top right: category-specific re-
sponses in the FFA did not differ for visible or invisible faces. Below: visible faces are characterized by strong recurrent
interactions between FFA and earlier visual areas (left), and by strong synchronous activity in the theta, beta, and
gamma bands (right). From: Fahrenfort et al. (2012).
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the boundary between figure and background.
This was followed by a sort of “filling in” of en-
hanced activity between the boundary regions.
We  thus  see  an  incremental  process,  starting
with  boundary  segmentation  and  followed  by
surface  segmentation.  Similar  findings  have
been reported in humans using combined EEG
and TMS (Wokke et al. 2012). 
After  the  lesion,  the  boundary  enhance-
ment remained, which may indicate that texture
boundary detection mechanisms do not depend
on feedback from higher visual areas and hence
are mediated by horizontal connections within
V1,  or by recurrent interaction with V2.  The
centre  modulation,  where  the  figure  elements
are  “neurally  elevated”  from  the  background
elements, was completely abolished after the le-
sion, indicating that these figure-ground signals
do depend on recurrent interactions between V1
and higher-tier areas. This finding was modelled
on a realistic neural network of spiking neurons,
indeed formalizing the idea that local orienta-
tion contrast—and hence the boundary between
figure  and  ground—is  mediated  by  inhibitory
horizontal interactions between oriented recept-
ive fields, whereas the figure–ground signal de-
pended  on  excitatory  feedback  interactions
trickling  down  from  higher  to  lower  areas
(Roelfsema et  al. 2002).  Recently,  laminar re-
cording of figure-ground signals in V1 confirmed
this idea (Self et al. 2013). These results show
that the long-latency figure-ground segregation
effects depend on incremental interactions medi-
ated by both horizontal and feedback connec-
tions.  That may be  the  reason why they are
most  vulnerable  to  anaesthesia,  masking,  and
other manipulations of consciousness. 
Tononi  modelled  several  neural  architec-
tures in order to find the connection parameters
that fulfil the requirements for achieving max-
imally-integrated information. The optimal ar-
chitecture  consists  of  neurons  that  each  have
specific and different connections patterns, yet
are sufficiently interconnected for each neuron
to be able to connect to another via a few steps.
Uniformly, or strictly modularly organized net-
works  are  less  optimal.  The  thalamo-cortical
system fits these requirements very well. On the
one  hand,  neurons  should  be  interconnected,
otherwise information is not integrated. On the
other hand, too much interconnection leads to a
loss of specific information, as all neurons start
doing  the  same thing,  which  happens  in  epi-
lepsy or deep sleep—states that are indeed ac-
companied by a loss  of  consciousness  (Tononi
2004,  2008,  2012). The contextual modulations
that have been explored here seem to exactly
express these properties: on the one hand, the
neural responses are very specific,  in that the
major part of the response is driven by the fea-
tures that are within the (small) receptive field.
But on the other hand, the integration of these
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Figure 10: Contextual modulation (i.e., figure–ground responses, see figure 5) for various positions of the receptive
field of V1 neurons (vertical axis), and extending over time (horizontal axis). In an intact monkey, modulation arises
first at the figure-ground boundary, followed by a “filling-in” of the boundaries. After a lesion to the peri-striate belt of
the visual cortex, only the boundary modulation remains, while filling-in has been abolished (Lamme et al. 1998a). 
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features rides on top of that response as a mod-
erate modulation, expressing perceptual integra-
tion that may cover a large spatial extent, yet
never  even beginning to fully override the in-
formation  carried  by  the  neuron.  In  other
words,  visual  neurons  have  categorization  as
their main priority, yet they also integrate these
categories at some point in their response. That
is the moment in time where the seed for con-
scious  perception  is  laid  (Lamme 2003,  2006,
2010a, 2010b).
8 Is there a functional boundary between
unconscious and conscious vision?
I have taken the two extreme ends of conscious-
ness manipulation: clear-cut visible and above-
threshold items in awake subjects veridically re-
porting  their  visual  experiences  versus  visual
processing in anaesthesia, blindsight, or during
profound masking or suppression (figure 11). If
we don’t accept conscious vision in the former,
and the absence of it in the latter, there is no
use  arguing  about  the  phenomenon  of  con-
sciousness.  Even  so,  it  has  been  surprisingly
hard  to  find  fundamental  differences  in  the
workings of  many visual  functions in  the two
conditions.  Categorization  of  visual  stimuli,
even up to high levels, clearly stands independ-
ent of conscious visibility. It is unclear whether
interference—i.e., the fact that features are no
longer treated independently—depends on con-
sciousness:  shifts  in  brightness  perception  do
not depend on consciousness, while it is uncer-
tain whether the transition from wavelength to
colour perception (and colour constancy) marks
the  conscious-unconscious  divide.28 Similarly,
the status of inference phenomena like those ob-
served in the Kanizsa triangle is uncertain. 
This is all the more surprising given that
many of these functions have traditionally been
viewed as expressing the transition from merely
physical features detected by sensor arrays to-
wards the perceptual interpretation of this in-
28 Yet this transition may be the “Holy Grail” for those willing to un-
derstand qualia—or at least for those believing in “soft qualia”, i.e.,
phenomenal  properties  that  are  not  entirely  detached from visual
functioning, and having some sort of neural substrate (Block 1996,
2005, 2007). 
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Figure 11: Table summarizing the influence of consciousness manipulation on various visual functions. Colours indic-
ate whether functions (rows) still operate under aa particular manipulation (columns). In the case of conflicting or un -
certain evidence (yellow), the cases or conditions where the function still seems present is written in green; the cases
where the function is absent are written in red. All functions are assumed to be present in conscious vision. For each
visual function, an icon depicts its most prominent example. See text for explanation.
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formation. Moreover, they mark the integration
of stimulus-driven input with our knowledge of
the world, such that we arrive at visual “mean-
ing”.  Recently,  there  has  been  quite  some in-
terest in so called predictive coding frameworks
of vision (Rao & Ballard 1999; Panichello et al.
2012). In these frameworks, vision is seen as a
type of Bayesian inference, where our prediction
(prior)  of  the  outside  world  is  continuously
matched with our sensory input, and where the
difference is propagated through the network as
an “error signal”, which then results in an up-
dating of the model (posterior). Indeed, expect-
ations bias our perception of  the world,  most
strongly in the face of ambiguous stimuli, but
also  in  the  case  of  unambiguous  stimuli
(Panichello et al. 2012). Although it has been
suggested that either the matching process, the
prior, or the posterior in this type of inference
have  some  relation  to  consciousness,29 this  is
questionable given the automaticity of many ex-
pectation effects. For example, the mere statist-
ical dominance of a particular stimulus type is
sufficient  to  bias  perceptual  interpretations
(Chopin &  Mamassian 2012).  Also,  expected
words break from continuous flash suppression
sooner than unexpected words (Costello et al.
2009).30
All in all, the relation between conscious-
ness on the one hand and categorization, inter-
ference,  and  inference  processes  on  the  other
hand ranges from non-existent to weak. A much
stronger case seems possible for functions like
the  grouping  of  image  elements  according  to
Gestalt  laws  and  figure-ground  segregation.
These operations seem to depend strongly  on
the conscious state, and on conscious perception
of the stimuli involved (figure  11). This is sur-
prising, given their relative “simplicity”. For ex-
ample, the grouping of similarly-oriented or col-
linear line segments may be achieved by hori-
zontal connections in the primary visual cortex
(Bosking et al. 1997, see above). Figure–ground
29 In my reading, the predictive coding models are sometimes rather
vague about exactly which signal mediates conscious experience. It is
often seen to be a combination of the matching process and the pos-
terior, e.g., Seth et al. (2011).
30 But note that this is in fact nothing more than a semantic prim-
ing  experiment.  The  results  primarily  show that  if  a  semantic
category has been activated, this category will then break earlier
from CFS. 
segregation—and  its  neurophysiological  correl-
ate—has been successfully modelled in a recur-
rent network architecture consisting of orienta-
tion-selective visual neurons in three hierarchic-
ally-organized visual areas, combined with some
inhibitory horizontal interactions and excitatory
feedback  (Roelfsema et  al. 2002).  Regardless,
the experimental data clearly show that if we
want to identify visual functions that mark the
transition from unconscious processing to con-
scious  vision,  grouping  according  to  Gestalt
laws (incremental grouping) and figure-ground
segregation31 (or perceptual organization in gen-
eral) are our best bets.32
9 Is it all about distance, or time?
So  why  do  Gestalt  grouping  and  segregation
bear  such  a  close  relation  to  consciousness?
From  a  neural  perspective,  they  differ  from
most other functions in that they depend on in-
teractions between neurons at rather large dis-
tances.  For  example,  for  a  neuron to  “know”
whether it sits on the figure or the background
of the stimulus in figure  5, information has to
travel over a distance of about 20 millimetres in
the visual cortex.33 Moreover,  the modulations
of neural activity that accompany this “know-
ing” depend on the incremental push-pull inter-
actions between horizontal and feedback connec-
tions (Lamme & Roelfsema 2000;  Roelfsema et
al. 2002;  Roelfsema 2006). These require quite
extensive processing steps, given that the con-
31 Of course one could argue that in the case of a face on a blank back-
ground there also is figure–ground segregation. This type of segrega-
tion clearly does not depend on consciousness. This touches on the
debate  on  whether  categorization  is  possible  without  segregation
(Wagemans et al. 2012).
32 A promising theory of consciousness holds that conscious repres-
entations  and states  are  characterized by the integration of in-
formation, or more precisely, on the formation of complexes of in-
tegrated information (Tononi 2004,  2008,  2012). That integrated
information  characterizes  consciousness  is,  however,  mainly  de-
rived from a set of axioms and introspective or intuitive thought
experiments,  most of  which have already been discussed in the
previous text or footnotes (Tononi 2012). What this review of ex-
perimental findings however shows is that the “integration of in-
formation”  comes in  many guises,  not  all  of  which are  equally
strongly  related  to  consciousness.  A  somewhat  more  precise
definition of “integrated information” may be guided by these ex-
perimental findings.
33 The figure is 4 degrees of visual angle wide. Neurons in human V1
with receptive fields at that distance are about 20 mm apart, given a
cortical magnification factor of 0.2 degrees per millimetre at 2.0 de-
grees eccentricity (Duncan & Boynton 2003).
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textual Gestalt effects typically manifest them-
selves at long latency. 
Intuitively, seeing an illusion like the Kan-
izsa triangle, or the contextual shifts in bright-
ness or colour perception discussed above, also
seems to depend on “long range” interactions:
information travels over large distances in the
visual  field.  But  distance  travelled  over  the
visual field does not always equal distance trav-
elled in the brain. These phenomena may de-
pend on fairly hardwired and feedforward mech-
anisms,  and  their  neural  correlates  typically
have  relatively  short  temporal  latencies  (Von
der Heydt et  al. 1984).  Seemingly,  these phe-
nomena  tap  into  mechanisms  that  have  high
ecological  relevance to the  visual  system,  and
are hence solved in a few processing steps, using
dedicated  feedforward  mechanisms.  The  same
holds  for  all  categorization  responses  in  the
brain, regardless of their apparent complexity:
the progression from low-level to high-level fea-
ture detection (including categorization of faces
or other complex stimuli) proceeds in a feedfor-
ward “sweep” that lasts 100 ms or less (Lamme
& Roelfsema 2000).
What emerges is the nagging feeling that
consciousness has nothing to do with the seem-
ing  complexity  or  “high-levelness”  of  a  visual
function. Whether a visual function depends on
consciousness  may  simply  be  related  to  the
amount of space that has to be travelled in the
brain,  how many processing steps  have to be
taken in between, and hence how much time it
takes to complete. This converges onto a thesis
that we may call: 
The STERP-property of phenomenal rep-
resentations =Df conscious representations
depend on the spatio-temporally extended
neural  processing  mediated  by  recurrent
interactions.
What that extent is remains to be specified, but
has  been  studied  directly  by  Faivre &  Koch
(2014),  who  measured  the  effects  of  stimuli
made invisible using CFS on the perception of
subsequent  visible  stimuli.  Both  for  apparent
motion and for biological motion walkers, it was
found that unconscious motion integration only
occurred for relatively short (100 ms) and not
for  longer  (400,  800,  1200ms)  temporal  inter-
vals.  Meng et al. (2007) observed that  neural
signals  representing  the  spatial  filling-in  of  a
grating over a gap in the visual field depended
on conscious  experience  of  the  grating.34 This
suggests that for visual information to literally
“bridge a distance” across the visual field, con-
sciousness is required. 
The importance  of  the  spatial  and tem-
poral extent of neural processing in conscious-
ness  also  emerges  from  an  entirely  different
field:  that  of  disorders  of  consciousness.  It  is
generally believed that  there is  a  gradual  de-
crease of consciousness from the healthy awake
state  towards  minimally  conscious,  vegetative
state  and  coma.  These  states  also  show  a
gradual decrease in the extent of neural interac-
tions,  in  both  space  (Casali et  al. 2013)  and
time  (Bekinschtein et  al. 2009).  Particularly
striking is the finding that the presence or ab-
sence of consciousness (in this case: the differ-
ence between minimally conscious and vegetat-
ive state patients) could be classified by simply
looking at the amount of “shared symbolic in-
formation” in the EEG35 at various distances in
the brain. Shared symbolic information at dis-
tances of 10 cm and beyond signalled the pres-
ence of consciousness, and moreover was indic-
ative  of  the  prognosis  of  vegetative  state  pa-
tients  (whether  they would  eventually  awaken
or  not).  Strikingly,  this  measure  hardly  de-
pended on the location of the interactions (King
et  al. 2013).  In  other  words,  whenever  and
wherever neurons share information at distances
of 10 cm or more, there is consciousness.36
Both  distance  and  time  are  continuous.
Arguing  that  consciousness  is  related  to  the
temporal or spatial extent of neural processing
therefore almost automatically seems to imply
that  the  transition  from  unconscious  to  con-
34 It did not depend on attending the grating, however, which is of rel -
evance to the discussion on the relation between attention and con-
sciousness. See below (Lamme 2003, 2004, 2006, 2010a, 2010b).
35 At each electrode, EEG signals were first transformed into symbolic
shapes (e.g., up-down-up) for various temporal intervals. Then it was
determined to what extent these EEG “symbols” covaried between
electrode pairs of various distances, after the exclusion of covariance
that was caused by simple volume conduction. 
36 Which made me wonder whether any piece of cortex of 10 cm or larger
that is held on life support in a petri-dish might have consciousness. 
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scious  processing  is  gradual  rather  than  dis-
crete. This is not necessarily so, however. Re-
current processing is mediated by highly non-
linear  interactions,  and  in  such  interactions,
rather  discrete  phase  transitions  are  possible
(Steyn-Ross et  al. 1999;  Del Cul et al. 2007;
Hwang et al. 2012). It could thus very well be
that there is a discrete transition from a phase
where information integration is rather limited
to a phase that is characterized by extensive in-
formation integration, and that this transition
depends on the temporal or spatial extent of re-
current interactions.37 
Whether the transition from unconscious
to conscious processing is discrete or continuous
has been argued on different grounds, such as
on  the  distribution  of  behavioral  responses
(“seen” versus “not seen”) in relation to manip-
ulations  of  stimulus  variables  (Sergent &  De-
haene 2004;  Overgaard et al. 2006).  In signal
detection theory, the strength of perceptual in-
formation is considered to be continuous, while
the decision criterion imposes a discrete bound-
ary between what is reported as “seen” or “not
seen”. In its classic form, however, signal detec-
tion theory is agnostic about whether conscious-
ness is pre- or post-decisional. Recently, many
attempts have been made to incorporate con-
sciousness  into the framework of  signal  detec-
tion theory, and in many of these models con-
sciousness is considered post- rather than pre-
decisional (Maniscalco & Lau 2012; King & De-
haene 2014)—thus  the  boundary  between  the
conscious and unconscious is  taken to be dis-
crete.  Based  on neurophysiological  findings  in
the  monkey  visual  cortex,  a  signal-detection
model was devised in which consciousness was
considered pre-decisional. In this model, the dis-
tribution of sensory information was considered
bi-modal, reflecting either a conscious or an un-
conscious state. The model could explain both
the behavioral  and neurophysiological  findings
in the monkey visual cortex, obtained using a
variety of  stimulus strengths and decision cri-
37 It could even be that the mere fact that information exchange extends
over a particular time and space is critical for that exchange to be ac-
companied by a conscious sensation. When the same amount of informa-
tion would be exchanged much slower — as in plants — or much faster
— as in a supercomputer — or over a smaller or larger space (as in a mi-
crochip or over the internet) no conscious sensation ensues.
teria (Supèr et al. 2001). Note that also in this
pre-decisional model the conscious–unconscious
divide is discrete (or at least bi-modal), rather
than gradual.
10 The function of conscious vision
Could it be that Gestalt grouping and figure-
ground  segregation  (of  textured  images)  only
happen to go along with consciousness because
they take more time; because they require more
elaborate  computations,  not  provided  by  the
many dedicated feedforward pathways and mod-
ules of the brain? Normally, vision proceeds in a
fast  and feedforward fashion,  where  dedicated
neurons detect features and categories. Using its
hardwired  connections,  the  visual  system  can
swiftly detect the most relevant objects:  food,
mates, or dangerous animals. Some objects are
more  difficult  to  discern,  and  require  prior
knowledge or the computation of neighbourhood
relations between image elements: food behind a
leaf,  a  sweet  versus a sour apple.  That takes
slightly more—but not  too much more—time,
because many of  the required interactions are
hardwired as well. They are hardwired because
the  visual  system has  been  exposed  to  these
“visual problems” very often, either during evol-
ution or during visual  experience.  Then there
are visual problems that are even more difficult:
a camouflaged animal in a crowded forest (fig-
ure  7),  only  visible  via  subtle  differences  in
overall texture or motion. In this case, all visual
resources and mechanisms have to come to the
rescue. Only by combining the input from many
neurons in a versatile way can the visual “solu-
tion” be found. That may be the function of
consciousness in the visual domain: to combine
the otherwise unconscious modules and mechan-
isms in a flexible way so as to solve otherwise
unresolvable visual problems leading to a second
thesis that we may call:
The SUPER-property of phenomenal rep-
resentations =Df neural representations re-
quire consciousness and invoke phenomen-
ality as soon as what needs to be represen-
ted  can  no  longer  be  represented  by  a
single dedicated module or mechanism, yet
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requires  the interaction of  these modules
so that  a super-positioned representation
emerges.
From the point of view of consciousness, a hier-
archy  of  visual  functions  can  then  be  made.
This starts with largely unconscious feature de-
tection  and  object  categorization.  These  fea-
tures start to influence each other, and are no
longer treated independently, so that categories
form that are about the relations between im-
age  items  (base  groupings,  short  range  incre-
mental grouping). With this, there is a trans-
ition from the physical properties of the visual
input as they are presented to the sensor array
to  the  meaning38 of  these  properties  (e.g.,
wavelength to colour). During these operations,
features  and categories  are  matched with  our
knowledge and expectations of the world, em-
bedded in  the  anatomical  organization  of  the
visual cortex, aiding in the transformation from
visual  input  towards  meaning  (inference).  Fi-
nally, all this information is combined into an
organized percept. The longer these operations
take, the more distance has to be travelled in
the brain, and the more conscious these opera-
tions become.39
If nothing interferes, the visual system will
always strive towards optimally integrating the
available information, so that the richest inter-
pretation  of  all  available  information  is
achieved, and all  features have been detected,
all  inferences  have  been  made,  all  image  ele-
ments are combined and all potential ambigu-
ities have been resolved. If  this process is cut
short, for example by masking or a TMS pulse
(Pascual-Leone &  Walsh 2001;  Silvanto et  al.
2005),  there  is  no  integrated  end-result.  And
seemingly there is no conscious sensation either.
Regardless of this, many features have still been
detected, many inferences have been made, and
38 Note that “meaning” in this context refers to the meaning information
has to the organism, shaped by and in accordance with its evolutionary
history and ontogenesis (like colour has the “meaning” of the edibility of
fruit). It does not refer to “meaning” in any linguistic sense.
39 That may explain why two seemingly similar phenomena like  the
brightness and colour shifts of figure 2, and the arrival at colour con-
stancy in figure 3 are depend on consciousness in different ways. Col-
our constancy requires the computation of the full distribution of
wavelengths over the entire image, which takes more time than the
computations required to compute brightness of adjacent patches. 
the brain can use this information to achieve its
goals. Behaviour may be influenced, or set into
motion (Dehaene et al. 1998). Priming will oc-
cur, as well as all sorts of unconscious cognition
(Van Gaal & Lamme 2012). Without conscious-
ness,  and  without  maximal  integration,  the
visual system is far from helpless. It can do less,
but it can still do a lot.
From this perspective, the function of con-
sciousness in vision is just to enable that last
push. That is, to resolve the visual issues that
cannot  be  dealt  with  otherwise.40 And  with
that, visual functions grow more complex, and
evolve from their basic form into more sophist-
icated  versions.  A good  example  comes—once
again—from the processing of  faces.  The core
property of face-selective neurons is to respond
in a category-selective manner: they distinguish
between  faces  and  other  objects.  They  do  so
from the  very  first  action-potentials  that  are
fired. At that moment, however, category spe-
cificity is still very basic, in the sense that all
types of  faces  evoke a similar  response (Rolls
1992). At a later moment in time, however, re-
sponses typically become more and more spe-
cific. In the monkey visual cortex, face cells dis-
tinguish between different viewpoints and differ-
ent emotional expressions of faces with a delay
of about 50 milliseconds relative to the categor-
ical face/non-face response (Sugase et al. 1999).
View  invariant  identity  representations  arise
even  later,  with  a  delay  of  about  200  ms
(Freiwald &  Tsao 2010).  At these  delays,  the
face-selective neurons will  have established re-
current  interactions  with  lower  (and  higher)
level neurons across the brain, allowing for these
more  sophisticated  classifications  to  be  ex-
pressed in the response. 
We may thus conclude that face recogni-
tion “as we know it”—i.e., not just categorizing
face versus non-face, but seeing that face, know-
ing what it looks like, who it is, and what emo-
40 Maybe that is  the reason why the transition from unconscious to
conscious processing also marks the transition between veridical and
inferred representations (e.g., from wavelength to colour). Dedicated
modules can do their thing in isolation, and therefore have no need
to compromise towards a non-veridical representation of the outside
world. When modules interact, the necessity may arise to comprom-
ise veridical representations to achieve global coherence into the com-
bined  super-positioned  representation  that  cannot  be  represented
otherwise.
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tion  it  carries—is  a  visual  function  tightly
linked to conscious rather than unconscious vis-
ion. The main reason for this lies in the fact
that  in  conscious  recognition  we  go  beyond
simple categorization, and move towards a func-
tion where the integration of all possible inform-
ation  about  that  face  (its  viewpoint,  colour,
identity, emotional expression, etc.) is required. 
This  may  raise  the  question  of  how  we
then become conscious of an extremely simple
stimulus,  such as  an oriented black line  on a
completely  white  background.  With  such  a
simple stimulus, there seems to be no need for
any elaborate binding, incremental grouping, or
inference. Neurons in the primary visual cortex
can detect the line and its orientation within a
few  action  potentials.  There  seems  to  be  no
need to call in the functions that are enabled by
conscious processing. So why is it, then, that we
still see the black line on the white background?
First, it should be noted that the notion of
“simple”  stimuli  is  more  complex  than  one
would expect. For example, it was shown that
subjects can rapidly detect animals or vehicles
in complex natural scenes, even when their at-
tention  is  simultaneously  focused  on  another
task. Discriminating large T’s from L’s, or bi-
sected colour disks from their mirror images was
impossible under the same dual task paradigm.
Apparently,  seemingly  simple  letter  or  disk
stimuli  require more attentive processing than
seemingly  complex  natural  scenes  (Li et  al.
2002),  suggesting  that  they  take  longer  and
more  elaborate  processing.  In  blindsight,  sub-
jects can discriminate lines of different orienta-
tions,  suggesting  that  conscious  processing  is
not required for these simple stimuli. However,
discrimination  performance—although  above
chance—is typically worse than for consciously-
seen line segments, suggesting that something is
“missing”  from  the  neural  representations
formed in blindsight compared to those in con-
scious vision.
So  what  might  the  more  elaborate  pro-
cessing steps that lift the unconscious represent-
ation of a black line towards a conscious repres-
entation of that line be? First, it is known that
neurons  in  many  visual  areas  beyond  V1  re-
spond to orientated line segments. At each level,
receptive  fields,  and  hence  spatial  frequency
preferences, differ. This means that (the orient-
ation  of)  the  line  segment  is  represented  at
many different spatial  scales  across the visual
cortex. Only the integration of these differently-
scaled  representations,  via  recurrent  interac-
tions, yields a precise and conscious representa-
tion. The same holds for other properties of the
“simple”  line  segment,  such  as  its  colour,  its
depth, and its relation to the background.41 In-
deed, oriented lines are fairly easy to mask (in
fact easier than faces), indicating that their con-
scious percept depends on more elaborate pro-
cessing steps than expected for such a simple
stimulus.
11 The impact of conscious vision on the 
brain
If a particular visual problem has to be dealt
with often, the brain will start to build connec-
tions so that the problem can be resolved more
rapidly. Visual problems that require long and
elaborate processing will eventually be resolved
in milliseconds. By building new and dedicated
connections, elaborate processing steps may be
simplified into a fast and short set of interac-
tions.  Conscious  processing  will  turn  into un-
conscious  processing,  because  conscious  pro-
cessing has triggered perceptual learning that in
turn evokes  synaptic  changes  that  create new
“dedicated modules” that can do the job uncon-
sciously. This leads to a third thesis:42
The LEARN-property of phenomenal rep-
resentations  =Df neural  representations
that require consciousness and invoke phe-
nomenality, at the same time evoke syn-
aptic plasticity mechanisms and learning,
41 Even something as simple as a white background will give the black
line  another visual  “meaning” than a yellow background,  a green
background, or a textured background. The same point has been for-
mulated by Giulio Tononi (2004, 2008, 2012): a conscious representa-
tion is conscious because it differentiates from the endless other po-
tential representations that could have been. In this case: the ori-
ented black line on the white background is one of the endless pos-
sible configurations of lines on backgrounds, and only by integrating
the information of line and background is it known which of these
configurations is actually present.
42 Similar ideas exist in the context of motor learning: a task that first re-
quires extensive conscious practice will gradually become more and more
automatic, up to the point where it can be executed fully unconsciously. 
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in an attempt to make these representa-
tions less dependent on consciousness and
invoking less phenomenality.
Indeed, there are several arguments for linking
consciousness to perceptual learning. Plasticity
in  the  visual  cortex comes  in  many temporal
and spatial  scales.  There  are fast-  and short-
range adaptations or recalibrations, expressed in
altered  stimulus-response  dependencies  (e.g.,
contrast  normalization).  But  receptive  fields
may also  change  in  size  or  feature  selectivity
when exposed to repeated stimulation. Recept-
ive fields literally grow or shift position when
their surrounds are stimulated but the receptive
field is not (Gilbert & Wiesel 1992). Prolonged
depletion of input leads to the induction of new
connectivity via fast axonal sprouting of hori-
zontal connections (Yamahachi et al. 2009). Ho-
rizontal  connections in  particular  play an im-
portant role in both immediate and longer term
plasticity  of  the  visual  cortex  (Gilbert et  al.
1996). The repeated execution of Gestalt group-
ing via the same connections may therefore in-
duce learning (Gilbert et al. 2001), as, for ex-
ample, is observed in the learning of texture se-
gregation (Karni & Sagi 1991) or in the gradual
improvement  of  contour  integration  during
childhood development (Kovács et al. 1999). In
addition, perceptual learning induces a reorgan-
ization  of  the  areas  involved  in  encoding  the
learned object—a process that is mediated by
feedback connections (Sigman &  Gilbert 2000;
Sigman et al. 2005). It seems that the neural
machinery that mediates Gestalt grouping and
segregation is also the machinery that mediates
perceptual learning.
Furthermore, feedback and horizontal con-
nections  have  been  linked  to  the  molecular
mechanisms of neural plasticity. A key compon-
ent in neural plasticity is the NMDA receptor
pathway,  and in the monkey,  NMDA receptor
blocking using APV reduces contextual figure–
ground modulation (Self et al. 2012). Similarly,
in  humans,  figure–ground  segregation  is  im-
paired using Ketamine, an anaesthetic which se-
lectively  blocks  the  NMDA  receptor  at  low
doses (Meuwese et al. 2013). Also, it was found
that  Ketamine  at  sub-anaesthetic  doses  inter-
feres  with  the  leaning  of  Mooney  figures.
Mooney figures are high-contrast versions of im-
ages that are hard to recognize when you don’t
know what the image is about. Once you have
seen its original natural contrast version, how-
ever, the Mooney image is readily recognizable.
It was found that the neural representation of
Mooney images starts to resemble that of their
natural versions once they are learned. Ketam-
ine  disrupts  this  rapid  learning  process,  but
only in V1, and not in higher visual areas, in-
dicating that feedback from higher areas to V1
is selectively disrupted by Ketamine (Van Loon
et al. submitted).
In sum, there are strong indications that
link conscious visual processing and its neural
machinery—horizontal and feedback connection
—are linked to perceptual learning and the mo-
lecular mechanisms involved. This may open up
a path to a more molecular  understanding of
consciousness. In addition, it provides us with a
clear idea about the function of consciousness:
that of building a new repertoire of visual func-
tions, so that eventually conscious processing is
no longer necessary. 
It  must be noted however,  that the link
between consciousness and learning is controver-
sial.  Many instances  of  “unconscious”  percep-
tual learning exist (e.g.,  Gutnisky et al. 2009;
Seitz et  al. 2009;  Seitz &  Watanabe 2003;
Schwiedrzik et  al. 2011).  An  important  issue
here,  however,  is  whether  these  are  cases  of
learning  without  conscious  experience  of  the
stimuli  that  induce  the  learning,  or  whether
they are instances of learning without cognitive
access  or  attention  to  these  stimuli  (see
Meuwese et al. 2013). A further clarification of
the role of consciousness in learning is required.
12 The dolphins of consciousness 
research
I have examined the defining characteristics of
conscious versus unconscious vision. Incremental
grouping and segregation according to Gestalt
laws  seems  to  be  a  defining  characteristic  of
conscious vision. Other visual phenomena and
functions, like interference or inference, are less
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strongly  linked.  Feature  detection  and higher-
level  categorization  clearly  do  not  mark  the
transition from unconscious to conscious vision.
From  a  neural  perspective,  it  can  be  argued
that conscious processing is linked to those op-
erations  that  require  spatially  and temporally
extended processing,  where  neurons engage  in
incremental  interactions  involving many steps.
These processes are selectively dependent on ho-
rizontal  and  feedback  connections.  Moreover,
these interactions induce learning, as they oper-
ate along highly plastic  neural  pathways,  and
use the molecular machinery that is directly in-
volved in neural plasticity.
We  can  now  start  using  these  defining
characteristics  to  answer  more  difficult  ques-
tions. Is there consciousness in the right half-
brain of a split brain patient (Sperry 1984)? Is
there consciousness without attention (Koch &
Tsuchiya 2012)? Is there consciousness in neg-
lect or extinction (Lamme 2003)? Is it appro-
priate to talk about inattentional “blindness”,
where  people  do  not  remember  having  seen
something  while  their  attention  was  engaged
elsewhere?  What  exactly  happens  during
change blindness (Simons & Rensink 2005)? Is
there  consciousness  in  animals  (Edelman &
Seth 2009), or in a vegetative state (Owen et
al. 2006)?  These  are  the  “dolphins”  of  con-
sciousness research, situations that are hard to
position in the current taxonomy of conscious
versus unconscious, because much controversy
exists  about  the  presence  or  absence  of  con-
scious  experience  in  those  conditions.  With
this,  I  hope to have given some usable argu-
ments  that  can  settle  such  controversies.  My
claim would simply be that whenever we see
the defining properties of conscious vision that
have  been  laid  out  here  (i.e.,  incremental
Gestalt  grouping  and  segregation),  there  is
conscious vision, regardless of whether there is
conscious access or report (e.g.,  Scholte et al.
2006). More in general, the more fruitful stance
towards consciousness would be to let all the
available evidence converge into general theses,
such as those derived here, and then take these
as the defining characteristics of conscious pro-
cessing  and  consciousness,  regardless  of
whether they fit our introspective intuition of
what  consciousness  is  or  should  be.  Defining
consciousness  as  the  process  that  builds  on
spatio-temporally  extended  neural  processing
(STERP property),  that  enables  the  building
of  super-positioned  representations  that  indi-
vidual modules cannot provide (SUPER prop-
erty), and that evokes synaptic plasticity and
learning (LEARN property) yields clear defin-
ing characteristics.  These  characteristics  go  a
great length towards elucidating important fea-
tures of phenomenality (its integrated nature,
Gestalt  properties),  towards  explaining  the
nature of conscious experience (perceptual or-
ganization,  interference,  inference),  and  are
hinting  towards  a  potential  function  of  con-
sciousness  (learning)  and  its  molecular  basis.
What I consider irrelevant characteristics (such
the ability to report about an experience, see
Lamme 2010a, 2010b) generally do no such ex-
plaining.  It  is  better to build  a taxonomy of
conscious versus unconscious processing on de-
fining  characteristics  than on irrelevant  ones.
That has helped a lot in positioning dolphins
in the taxonomy of species. It will also help a
lot  in  positioning  the  wild  amalgam of  phe-
nomena that the field of consciousness research
has produced so far. And it will enable us to
give consciousness its proper ontological status.
But I have already contributed to that discus-
sion extensively elsewhere (Lamme 2003, 2004,
2006,  2010a,  2010b), so I will lay that to rest
here.
At the crack of dawn, something magical
happens. Night turns into day, life springs, vi-
brations  fill  the  air.  We know,  it  is  just  the
earth rotating. But a very fundamental trans-
ition it remains. Unconscious or conscious pro-
cessing, it’s all neurons doing their job, firing
action potentials,  exchanging chemicals,  trans-
ferring  information.  But  somehow,  suddenly,
they “turn on the light”. You see. You have a
conscious sensation of that dawn. Isn’t it beau-
tiful? You should take a picture of it.
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